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Key points 
 In 2014, the European Commission introduced new Guidelines on State Aid to 
Airports and Airlines, which properly balance intra-regional travel and issues of 
unfair competition.  
 
 In determining whether an act constitutes unlawful state aid, a distinction must be 
drawn between economic and non-economic activities. Though the former activities 
are properly regarded as constituting state aid, the latter may constitute such aid where 
the public authority overcompensates the costs incurred by the recipient.  
 
 To determine whether an economic advantage has been achieved, the Market 
Economy Operator Principle is applied. This considers whether in similar 
circumstances, a private operator, having regard to the foreseeability of obtaining a 
return, would have granted the same funding.  
 
 The imposition of greater publication requirements on Member States will facilitate 
greater transparency in decision-making.  
 
Abstract  
As it relates to the European Union airline and airport sector, the desired goal of the 
European Commission is healthy competitiveness through the introduction of a level playing 
field. The clarity of the recent guidelines on state aid to airlines and airports will assist 
Member States and other public bodies in determining whether any public assistance falls 
afoul of the law; thereby distorting fair competition. Apart from imposing greater restrictions 
on investment aid and relaxing restrictions on operating aid, the 2014 guidelines, building on 
previous guidelines and case law, introduce the Market Economy Operator principle and 
clarifies the distinction between economic and non-economic activity. In addition to 
discussing these key concepts, the article, through a discussion of recent cases, shows the 
application of the Market Economy Operator Principle and is evidence of the Commission’s 
determination to strike down and demand the return of any unlawful state aid. 
I. Setting the Context: Boosting intra-regional travel 
The importance of sustainable transport infrastructure is evident in its inclusion in the Europe 
Union 2020 Strategy. This issue of sustainability is even more poignant given the range of 
issues affecting the transportation sector, which include, general economic conditions 
(recessionary concerns), competition from low-cost carriers, possible congestion at 
transportation hubs, fuel security, decarbonisation agendas and changing consumer needs (in 
particular, the availability of technologies which increase global connectivity and diminish 
the usefulness of travel). Though the European Union air transport sector linked over 
840,000,000 passengers in 2013 to their destinations (Eurostat, 2014), the increasing air 
traffic (8% increase on 2011) has not been met with a corresponding increase in profits. Quite 
to the contrary, many EU airlines, including many flag-carriers, are being significantly 
impacted by an increase in competition, both from low-cost airlines and other more 
affordable forms of transportation, such as rail. 
To turn this tide, many of these airlines have approached Member States for subsidies to 
boost their increasingly-slim profit margins. Much of this aid has been allegedly given under 
the threat of the removal of the carrier from that airport with the contingent implications on 
the profitability of the airport. It is well established under Article 107 on the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU or ‘The Treaty’) that any state aid, given through 
a Member State or its resources, which distorts or threatens to distort competition is 
prohibited. Prior to 2014, regulation for the air transport sector was provided by the combined 
effect of section 107(3)(c) of the TFEU, the Community guidelines for restructuring and 
restructuring firms in difficulty and the 1994 Aviation guidelines as supplemented by the 
2005 Aviation guidelines. These provisions sought to shield the transport sector from the 
negative effects of unfair competition which would ultimately undermine the desirable level 
playing field. The increasing regulation and decreasing profitability has brought to focus a 
trade-off between boosting regional travel and issues of unfair competition, in particular 
where some of this aid has not been approved by the European Commission (as required). In 
this turbulent economic and regulatory state, in February 2014, the European Commission 
published new guidelines on State Aid to Airports and Airlines. These have been regarded by 
the European Commission as “a key ingredient for a successful and competitive European 
aviation industry”. These guidelines, which replace the 1994 and 2005 Aviation guidelines, 
anticipate and address the challenges which will face the airline sector within the two coming 
decades. This article will briefly consider the substance of the new guidelines and assess 
recent Commission decisions on state aid to airlines. 
 
II. The Commission’s New Guidelines on State Aid to Airports and Airlines 
(February 2014) 
There are ten key elements of the new guidelines which will facilitate the movement of the 
air sector to a “successful” and “competitive” state of affairs. These simplified points are 
critical for airports, airlines and all relevant stakeholders. First, relying on ‘Leipzig-Halle 
airport’ judgment ([2011] ECR II-1311 at [93] and [94]), the Commission noted that, 
contrary to the approach taken in the 1994 Aviation guidelines, the activity of airlines which 
consists of providing transport services to passengers or undertaking constitutes economic 
activity. Thus, any such aid falls within the ambit of State aid control. Second, an important 
distinction must be made between activities of an airport which are of an economic and non-
economic nature. Though only the former can be properly considered for issues of state aid, 
the latter must be strictly limited to compensating the costs to which they give rise and may 
not be used to finance other activities.  Some examples include air traffic control, police 
customs, firefighting, activities necessary to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful 
interference or the investment of any infrastructure and equipment necessary to perform these 
activities. Though it may not be strictly regarded as state aid, any overcompensation by 
public authorities of costs incurred in such activities may constitute State aid.  
Third, whether a measure can be properly regarded as imputable to the state as a public 
undertaking depends on a range of circumstances including the context in which it was given. 
The European Court in France v Commission [2002] ECR I-4397, termed the ‘Stardust 
Marine’ judgment, noted other relevant factors at [55] and [56]. These include its integration 
into the structures of the public administration, the nature of its activities and the exercise of 
the latter on the market in normal conditions of competition with private operators, the legal 
status of the undertaking (in the sense of its being subject to public law or ordinary company 
law), the intensity of the supervision exercised by the public authorities over the management 
of the undertaking, or any other indicator showing, in the particular case, an involvement by 
the public authorities in the adoption of a measure or the unlikelihood of their not being 
involved, having regard also to the compass of the measure, its content or the conditions 
which it contains. 
Fourth, the resources of a public airport constitute public resources and thus any such airport 
may grant aid to an airline using the airport if the measure is imputable to the State (as 
determined under [3] above) and other conditions of Article 107(1) of TFEU are met. Fifth, at 
the heart of the Treaty is the issue of unfair competition. Whether this exists must be 
determined by a range of factors such as the airlines’ criteria of choice, in particular, the type 
of airport services provided, the clients concerned, population or economic activity (whether 
this relates to the area in which the service is established or the Member State as a whole is 
uncertain), alternative modes of transportation (such as access by land), charge level and 
overall conditions for use of airport infrastructure and services.  
Sixth, whether an economic advantage has been achieved is determined by the Market 
Economy Operator Principle, MEOP (also referred to as the Market Economy Operator Test 
or the ‘test’). The test is whether in similar circumstances a private operator, having regard to 
the foreseeability of obtaining a return and leaving aside all social, regional-policy and 
sectoral considerations, would have granted the same funding. Relying on Italy v Commission 
(‘Alfa Romeo’ judgment) [1991] ECR I-1 603 and Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Commission [2003] ECR II-435, regard may also be had to, a comparison of the prospects of 
profitability in the longer term over the lifetime of the investment. The relevant information 
is limited to available information and foreseeable developments at the time when the public 
funding is granted and should not rely on analysis based on a later situation. In determining 
the satisfaction of the MEO test, the absence of a business plan may be an indication that the 
test is not met. This is indicative and not decisive as this void could be substituted by the 
provision of prior analysis or internal documents from the public authorities or airport 
concerned. No regional or policy consideration should be regarded in determining the 
satisfaction of the MEO test, though it may be relevant in assessing the compatibility of aid. 
If the MEO test is not satisfied, the Commission will determine whether the aid is compatible 
within the EU’s Single Market. 
Eighth, where an airport has public resources at its disposal, aid to an airline may be excluded 
where the relationship between the airport and airline satisfies the MEO test. This is normally 
the case if the price charged for airport services corresponds to the market price 
(identification of a benchmark using comparator airports) or it can be demonstrated through 
an ex ante analysis that the airport/airline arrangement will lead to a positive incremental 
contribution for the airport. Ninth, there is some scope under the guidelines for the provision 
of start-up aid to airlines. To satisfy this, the state aid must contribute to a well-defined 
objective of common interest (such as increase mobility and connectivity or facilitation or 
regional development of remote regions), there must be a need for state intervention, state aid 
is the appropriate policy instrument, there must be an incentive effect, the aid must be 
proportionate and there must be an avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and 
trade. [There is also leeway for investment and operating aid to airports but this article is 
primarily focussed on state aid to airlines.] 
The tenth note-worthy point is the emphasis on transparency – thus, justice, fairness and 
reduction of unfair competition must be both done and seen to be done.  To ensure 
transparency, the Commission requires that Member States should publish the full text of 
each approved aid scheme, the identity of the granting authority and the identity of the 
individual beneficiaries, the form and amount of aid to each beneficiary, the date of granting, 
the type of undertaking, the region and principal economic sector. This information should be 
freely accessible and retained for a minimum of ten years.  
 
III. Recent decisions 
Below are some of the recent decisions of the European Commission with a special focus on 
allegations of illegal state aid to airlines.  The court’s seamless application of the market 
economy operator principle is noteworthy. 
France: Angoulême – Cognac International Airport, Pau Pyrénées Airport and 
Nîmes-Alès-Camargue-Cévennes Airport  
In July 2014, the European Commission ordered Ryanair, a low-cost Irish carrier, to repay 
almost €10m in illegal state aid which it obtained from three French regional airports. This 
primarily related to rebates and marketing-related services. Ryanair was required to pay 
€800,000 to the first airport (as listed above), €2.4m to the second airport and €6.4m to the 
final airport.  
As it relates to Angoulême - Cognac International Airport, the decision of the Commission 
was quite balanced: on the one hand, the Commission accepted that the financing provided 
was limited to compensating it for the provision of services of general economic interest. 
This facilitated the safe and viable air transport infrastructure in that region. Equally 
important was the fact that the nearest regional airport was 100km away. On the other hand, 
the court investigated the contractual rebates and marketing arrangements in 2008 between 
Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services (AMS) [a subsidiary of the airport]. Given that this 
arrangement would not satisfy the MEO test, they constituted state aid. On the issue of the 
satisfaction of this test, the court accepted that they could not be reasonably expected to 
improve the financial situation of the airport and no private actor, in a similar position, would 
have granted similar conditions. This was mere operating aid and could not be regarded as 
furthering the interests of the internal market. A similar conclusion was reached in relation to 
Pau Pyrénées Airport and the Nîmes-Alès-Camargue-Cévennes Airport. 
 Germany: Zweibrücken Airport 
In the midst of the insolvency proceedings of this German airport, the European Commission, 
on October 1, 2014, ordered Ryanair, which had stopped flying to this airport, since 2009, to 
repay €500,000 in illegal state aid. Ryanair has allegedly transported just over 50,000 
passengers to this airport. A higher demand for the return of illegal state aid (€1.2m) was 
imposed on Germanwings (a subsidiary of Deutsche Lufthansa) for marketing and airport 
services it had received. TUIFLY was also required to return €200,000 of illegal state aid. 
The Commission reached this conclusion having been satisfied that the market economy 
operator principle would not have facilitated the conclusion of these agreements given that 
these airlines were expected to generate more revenues than additional costs. Thus, no private 
operator would have concluded such loss-making agreements. 
 Italy: Alghero-Fertilia Airport 
The critical importance of considering the potential for undue economic advantage over their 
competitors is best understood by the contrasting outcomes of this October 1, 2014 decision. 
Both of the outcomes related to the operator of the Alghero airport, So.Ge.A.AL. On the one 
hand, the Commission concluded that agreements conducted with the airport operator and 
Ryanair/AMS, Aliytalia, Volare, bmibaby, Air Italy and Air Vallée could have been 
reasonably expected to improve the financial situation of the airport at the time they were 
entered and thus could not be regarded as giving any undue advantage. In contrast, the 
agreements concluded with Germanwings and Meridiana, constituted operating aid which 
could not be declared incompatible with EU rules.  
 Belgium: Charleroi Airport 
On October 1, 2014, the Commission also concluded that a number of measures granted by 
Belgium to Brussels South Charleroi Airport (BCSA), the operator of this airport, constituted 
State Aid. These measures included the concession fee which was lower than a normal 
market operator would impose. However, Ryanair, which has been credited, in part, with an 
increase of over 6.5 million passengers in 2013, was cleared of any receipt of illegal state aid. 
Having assessed its agreements with BCSA, the Commission held that these measures could 
not be properly termed state aid for two reasons: first, the measures could not be imputed to 
the State and, second, when granting the measures, the BCSA and Walloon Region behaved 
like a market economy operator. 
 
IV. Going Forward 
It has oft been said that a word to the wise is enough. Even more important, is a clear word to 
the wise. The clarity and simplicity of the new guidelines should serve well when advising 
airlines or airports on the scope of any state assistance. As it relates to airlines, the regulations 
are balanced in facilitating start-up airlines and the development of existing airlines. Further, 
the detailed mandatory reporting will ensure that past decisions are transparent and open to 
scrutiny, thus ensuring that the healthy competition desirable in the transport sector, and the 
European Union as a whole, is achieved. The recent decisions of the European Commission 
are evidence that any state aid is open to scrutiny. Contrary to beliefs that some airlines may 
be targeted, the decisions focus on any state aid, not the airline, which facilitates duplication 
as this is simply a waste of taxpayers’ money. This all inures to a conclusion that state aid 
guidelines in the air industry are flying in the right direction: later decisions of the court will 
continually add flesh to some of the uncertain provisions in the guidelines.  
